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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature Of The Case
Steven Reid Briggs appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence, contending the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Officer Deede made contact with Briggs after he drove into a parking lot.
(PSI, p. 2.) The officer smelled "the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage" and
observed that Briggs also had "bloodshot glassy eyes, very slurred speech, and
very clumsy movements." (PSI, p. 2.) Briggs was asked to perform field sobriety
tests but indicated that he would not cooperate with law enforcement in any way.
Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1-10; 1 PSI, p. 2.) He was offered and denied a breath test then
ultimately transported to the hospital to have his blood drawn by a hospital
phlebotomist. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 6-18; PSI, p. 2.)
The state charged Briggs with felony driving under the influence based on
his two prior convictions for driving under the influence in 2000. (R., pp. 17-19.)
Briggs filed a motion to suppress, contending the blood draw was not allowed by
Idaho statute and that Briggs himself had the right to use force to resist the
officers. (R., pp. 28-29; Tr., p. 7, L. 21 - p. 8, L. 8.) The court denied the motion
after a hearing. (R., p. 43.) Briggs thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea,
1

There are two transcripts in this case, but the state cites only to the one
transcript containing the 3/31/09 motion to suppress hearing, 4/27/09 change of
plea hearing, and 6/01/09 sentencing hearing, heretofore referred to simply as
"Tr.".
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reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion (Tr., p. 31, L.
13 - p. 32, L. 5), and the district court imposed a unified seven year sentence
with two years fixed. (R., pp. 58-59). Briggs timely appealed. (R., pp. 61-64.)

2

ISSUES
Briggs states the issues on appeal as:
1)

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Briggs' motion to
suppress the results of the forcible blood draw because the
forcible blood draw violated his fourth amendment rights as
outlined in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)?

2)

Assuming Schmerber permits nonconsensual, warrantless
blood draws in simple DUI offenses not involving an injury or
accident, did the district court err in denying the motion to
suppress where the State failed to prove exigent
circumstances justified subverting the warrant requirement in
Mr. Briggs' case?

3)

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Briggs' motion to
suppress the results of the forcible blood draw because it
was unreasonable under the circumstances?

(Appellant's Brief, p. 4.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Briggs failed to establish the district court erred when, consistent with
the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739
(2007), it denied his suppression motion, and has Briggs failed to advance any
proper justification for departing from controlling precedent?

3

ARGUMENT

Briggs Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
Briggs contends the district court erred in denying his suppression motion

because, he asserts (1) the blood draw "violated his constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures as outlined in Schmerber," (2) the state
failed to establish any exigency; and (3) the blood draw was unreasonable under
the circumstances.

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 5-28.) All of Briggs' arguments fail.

Pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,
160 P.3d 739 (2007), blood draws are constitutionally permissible so long as they
are reasonable. Briggs has failed to articulate any legitimate basis for overruling
Diaz nor has he demonstrated the blood draw performed in his case was
constitutionally unreasonable.

B.

Standard Of Review
"In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

this Court will defer to the district court's factual findings unless clearly
erroneous," but will "exercise[) free review over the district court's determination
as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts
found." Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741 (citing State v. Donato, 135
Idaho 469, 470, 20 P.3d 5, 6 (2001 )).

4

C.

Pursuant To The Idaho Supreme Court's Opinion In Diaz, Blood Draws
Are Constitutionally Permissible Where There Is Reasonable Grounds For
Suspicion Of Driving Under The Influence
In Diaz, the defendant was arrested for driving under influence, but

refused to participate in certain field sobriety tests or to submit to a breathalyzer
test. 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. As a result, Diaz was transported to the
hospital where a hospital technician drew his blood, which revealed a blood
alcohol concentration of .26.

19.:.

Diaz unsuccessfully moved to suppress the

results of the blood test on the grounds the test was performed in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights.

kl

On appeal, Diaz pursued the suppression issue, asserting "that death or
serious bodily injury is required to justify an involuntary blood draw under the
exigency exception to the warrant requirement."

Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160

P.3d at 741. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning:
Exigency, however, is not the lone applicable exception here;
consent is also a well-recognized exception to the warrant
requirement. In Idaho "any person who drives or is in actual
physical control" of a vehicle impliedly consents to evidentiary
testing for alcohol at the request of a peace officer with reasonable
grounds for suspicion of DUI. I.C. § 18-8002(1). Implied consent to
evidentiary testing is not limited to a breathalyzer test, but may also
include testing the suspect's blood or urine. I.C. § 18-8002(9). The
evidentiary test to be employed is of the officer's choosing. Here,
[the officer) had reasonable grounds to suspect that Diaz was
driving under the influence . . .. Because Diaz had already given
his implied consent to evidentiary testing by driving on an Idaho
road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw.
Without
addressing whether exigency also justified the blood draw, we hold
that the seizure of Diaz's blood fell within a well-recognized
exception to the warrant requirement.

5

Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302-303, 160 P.3d at 741-742 (internal case citations
omitted). 2

Pursuant to the Court's opinion in Diaz, it was constitutionally

permissible to obtain a blood sample from Briggs without first obtaining a warrant
because Officer Deed had "reasonable grounds" to suspect Briggs was driving
under the influence and Briggs consented to the testing by operating a motor
vehicle.
Briggs nevertheless contends the blood draw violated his Fourth
Amendment rights because, he argues, the Court's decision in Diaz is contrary to
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966), contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's "own precedent" in In Re
Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 744 P.2nd 92 (1987), and State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho
368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1910), and "renders portions of Idaho Code [sic] irrelevant
and superfluous." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Briggs is incorrect.
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that controlling precedent
will not be overruled "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time
to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate the plain,
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. Humphreys,
134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v.
Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)).

See also State v.

Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) ("[P]rior decisions of

2

Briggs erroneously asserts the Court in Diaz "conclude[ed] that the blood draw
could be justified either by exigent circumstances or consent." (Appellant's Brief,
p. 14.) It is clear, however, from the language quoted above that the Court did
not address whether the blood draw was appropriate pursuant to the exigent
circumstances exception. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742.
6

this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong or have proven over
time to be unjust or unwise.").

According to Briggs, "under Schmerber, a

warrantless blood draw is constitutionally permissible only where an officer has
probable cause to believe an individual involved in an injury accident was under
the influence of alcohol, and the officer has no time to obtain a warrant to seize
the quickly dissipating evidence." (Appellant's Brief, p. 24.) Briggs' rationale is
flawed because any language contained in Schmerber that limits its holding to
the facts of that particular case does not compel the conclusion that all blood
draws taken under different circumstances or pursuant to a different exception to
the warrant requirement are a fortiori unconstitutional.
In Schmerber, the Supreme Court addressed whether a forced blood draw
taken from Schmerber at a hospital where he was arrested while receiving
treatment for injuries suffered in an accident involving an automobile he had
been driving under the influence violated his constitutional rights.

384 U.S. at

758-59. The Court held the warrantless blood draw was justified due to exigent
circumstances, reasoning as follows:
The officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have
believed that he was confronted \Nith an emergency, in which the
delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances,
threatened "the destruction of evidence." [citation omitted] We are
told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish
shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it
from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where time
had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate
the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a
magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we
conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol
content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner's
arrest.

7

Id. at 770-71.
In concluding its opinion in Schmerber, the Court wrote:
We thus conclude that the present record shows no violation of
petitioner's right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. It bears repeating,
however, that we reach this judgment only on the facts of the
present record.
The integrity of an individual's person is a
cherished value of our society. That we today told that the
Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an
individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way
indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions
under other conditions.

liL. at 772.
Reading the foregoing language, as Briggs does, to limit its application to
cases "where an officer has probable cause to believe an individual involved in
an injury accident was under the influence of alcohol, and the officer has no time
to obtain a warrant to seize the quickly dissipating evidence" (Appellant's Brief, p.
24), does not demonstrate the Court's opinion in Diaz was contrary to
Schmerber.

Unlike the Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber, the Court's

opinion in Diaz was predicated on the consent exception to the warrant
requirement, not the exigent circumstances requirement. Given that the opinions
in Diaz and Schmerber addressed

!'NO

separate exceptions to the warrant

requirement, Briggs' assertion that Diaz is contrary to Schmerber fails.
Briggs' contention that Diaz is contrary to Griffiths and Woolery, which he
concedes "comported with United States Supreme Court precedent and the
United States Constitution" (Appellant's Brief, p. 13), also fails.

Although not

entirely clear, it appears Briggs' argument in relation to Griffiths is based upon his
assertion that "the Griffiths Court recognized the ability of a driver to refuse to

8

submit to an evidentiary test for blood alcohol content." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.)
Nothing in Diaz is, however, contrary to any recognition by the Court that a
motorist may refuse an evidentiary test.

As stated in Woolery:

"The Idaho

Legislature has acknowledged a driver's physical ability to refuse to submit to an
evidentiary test, but it did not create a statutory right for a driver to withdraw his
previously given consent to an evidentiary test for concentration of alcohol, drugs
or other intoxicating substances." 116 Idaho at 372, 775 P.2d at 1214 (emphasis
original). The Court further explained:
The Idaho Legislature has not created a statutory right to
refuse to submit to an evidentiary test to determine a driver's blood
alcohol level. It is difficult to believe that the Idaho Legislature
would provide an individual with a statutory right to prevent the
state from obtaining highly relevant evidence when a law
enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that individual
has committed a crime - whether it would be driving under the
influence, vehicular manslaughter, sale of a controlled substance,
or murder.
If the driver's constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures is complied with, the state
should not be prevented from obtaining such relevant evidence as
the alcohol content of the driver's blood.
Woolery, 116 Idaho at 373,775 P.2d at 1215.
The Court's consent analysis in Diaz is entirely consistent with the Court's
reasoning in \AJoo!er1. Briggs nevertheless claims Diaz !s contrary to Woolery -

an assertion that appears to be based upon the fact that Woolery involved an
injury accident. (See Appellant's Brief, p.11.) The Court's decision in Woolery
was not, however, dependent upon this fact. Although the Court in Woolery said
"[f]or the driver who has been involved in an accident which causes either serious
injury or death, the state must have the usual authority to investigate and collect
evidence which exists in any other felony investigation," nowhere in its opinion

9

did the Court limit the applicability of the exigency or consent exceptions to those
circumstances. Briggs' assertion otherwise is without merit.
Briggs' claim that Diaz also "renders portions of Idaho Code [sic] irrelevant
and superfluous" also fails because it is based on an incorrect interpretation of
I. C. § 18-8002(6)(b ). Briggs argues:
The only circumstances under which an officer is permitted
to require a driver, against his or her will, to submit to evidentiary
testing is when the officer has probable cause to believe the driver
has committed one of the following offenses: (1) aggravated DUI;
(2) vehicular manslaughter where the driver is under the influence;
(3) aggravated operation of a vessel on the waters of Idaho while
the operator is under the influence; and (4) criminal homicide
involving a vessel on the waters of Idaho while the operator is
under the influence. See Idaho Code§ 18-8002(6)(b).
(Appellant's Brief, p.18.)
Although Briggs correctly notes in a "but see" citation following this
argument that the Court in Diaz rejected this very argument and concluded, as it
did in Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 41 P.3d 257 (2002), and as the Court of
Appeals concluded in State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 65 P.3d 211 (Ct. App.
2002), that "[n]othing in Idaho Code § 18-8002 limits the officer's authority to
require a defendant to submit to a blood draw," and that I.C. § 18-8002(6)(b) is
only "intended to delineate when an officer could compel or order hospital
personnel to draw blood rather than just request that they do so."

Diaz, 144

Idaho at 303, 304, 160 P.3d at 742, 743 (emphasis original). Other than advance
an interpretation of I.C. § 18-8002(6)(b) that is inconsistent with the manner in
which the statute has repeatedly been interpreted, Briggs offers no argument in
support of his claim that the interpretation "renders portions of Idaho Code [sic]
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irrelevant and superfluous." This Court should, therefore, decline to consider this
claim. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("When
issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or
argument, they will not be considered.") Even if considered, Briggs has failed to
establish the appellate courts' interpretation of I.C. § 18-8002(6)(b) is incorrect or
renders other provisions of the Idaho Code "irrelevant and superfluous" merely
because other sections of I.C. § 18-8002 acknowledge that a motorist might
refuse to submit to evidentiary testing and provide penalties for such refusal.
In addition to arguing Diaz is contrary to Schmerber, Woolery, Griffith, and
"renders portions of Idaho Code [sic) irrelevant and superfluous," Briggs also
asserts consent may be withdrawn and claims "a State cannot condition the
granting of a privilege upon the renunciation of a constitutional right to due
process." (Appellant's Brief, pp.20-24.) Both arguments lack merit.
Implicit in the holding of Diaz, that the implied consent statute permits
evidentiary testing to determine blood alcohol content, is the conclusion that such
consent cannot be withdrawn.

Not only is this conclusion implicit in Diaz, it is

expressly articulated in State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697, 39 P.3d 637 (Ct. App.
2002), citing Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210. In Cooper, the Court of
Appeals stated:
Cooper argues that he revoked his previously implied
consent when he refused to submit to a blood test and that the
consequence of his refusal is suspension of his driver's license
pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A. This issue was previously raised and
rejected in Woolery, where our Supreme Court held that the Idaho
Legislature has acknowledged a driver's physical ability to refuse to
submit to an evidentiary test, but did not create a statutory right for

11

a driver to withdraw his previously given consent to an evidentiary
testing for alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances.
136 Idaho at 700, 39 P.3d at 640.
In support of his argument that the "State cannot condition the granting of
a privilege upon the renunciation of a constitutional right to due process," Briggs
relies on Slochower v. Bd. Of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), and Frost v.

R.R. Comm'n of California, 271 U.S. 583 (1926), and concludes "a forced blood
draw based on 'implied consent' is unreasonable in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause." (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-24.) This
argument is unpersuasive and contrary to relevant United States Supreme Court
authority.
In Slochower, the United States Supreme Court concluded that summary
dismissal of an employee, pursuant to the Charter of the City of New York that
permitted the city to terminate an employee whenever the employee invoked the
privilege against self-incrimination to avoid answering questions related to his
official conduct, violated due process.

350 U.S. 551.

In Frost, the Supreme

Court held that application of the Auto Stage and Truck Transportation Act of
California to a particular trucking company violated due process because it
effectively converted the private company into a common carrier by requiring the
company to obtain a certificate "declaring that public convenience and necessity
require the exercise" of the company's privilege to provide transportation
services.

271 U.S. 583.

The differences between the due process concerns

present in Slochower and Frost and the Fourth Amendment concerns at issue
here are readily apparent.

More notable, however, is Briggs' failure to cite
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relevant Supreme Court authority that addresses the constitutionality of implied
consent statutes.
In Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979), the United States Supreme
Court held that the Massachusetts implied consent statute that provided for an
immediate driver's license suspension upon a driver's refusal to submit to a
breath test following his or her arrest for driving under the influence did not
violate due process. Four years later, in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553,
559 (1983), the Supreme Court considered South Dakota's implied consent law
which "declares that any person operating a vehicle in South Dakota is deemed
to have consented to a chemical test of the alcoholic content of his blood if
arrested for driving while intoxicated." The Court stated, in relevant part:
Schmerber . . . clearly allows a State to force a person
suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood alcohol
test. South Dakota, however, had declined to authorize its police
officers to administer a blood-alcohol test against the suspect's will.
Rather, to avoid violent confrontations, the South Dakota statute
permits a suspect to refuse the test, and indeed requires police
officers to inform the suspect of his right to refuse. This permission
is not without a price, however. South Dakota law authorizes the
department of public safety, after providing the person who has
refused the test an opportunity for a hearing, to revoke for one year
both the person's license to drive and any nonresident and
operating privileges he may possess. Such a penalty for refusing
to take a blood-alcohol test is unquestionably legitimate, assuming
appropriate procedural protections.
Neville, 459 U.S. at 559-560 (footnote and citations omitted).
The Court, in responding to Neville's claim that he had a Fifth Amendment
right to refuse the test, further stated:
[T]he values behind the Fifth Amendment are not hindered when
the state offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the bloodalcohol test or having his refusal used against him. The simple

13

blood-alcohol test is so safe, painless, and commonplace, that
respondent concedes, as he must, that the state could legitimately
compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the test. Given,
then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly
legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State
offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant
penalties for making that choice. Nor is this a case where the state
has subtly coerced respondent into choosing the option it had no
right to compel, rather than offering a true choice. To the contrary,
the State wants respondent to choose to take the test, for the
inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is
far stronger than that arising from a refusal to take the test.

1..9.:. at 563-64 (citation omitted, emphasis original).
Because Briggs has failed to advance any legitimate basis for overruling
Diaz and because, as stated in Diaz, the blood draw was permissible pursuant to
Briggs' implied consent, Briggs has failed to establish the test results should
have been suppressed due to the lack of a warrant. 3

3

In a separate argument, Briggs asserts that even if "Schmerber applies to
simple DUI offenses which do not involve an injury or accident," and "assuming
Officer Case had probable cause to arrest Mr. Briggs for driving under the
influence," the state failed to meet its burden of "proving that exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless blood draw." (Appellant's Brief, p. 25.)
Because Briggs implicitly consented to the blood draw, the Court need not decide
whether another exception to the warrant requirement applies. To the extent the
Court does address the exigency issue, the state submits "the destruction of the
evidence by metabolism of alcohol in the blood provides an inherent exigency
which justifies the warrantless search." Woolery, 116 Idaho at 370, 775 P.2d at
1212; see also Worthington, 138 Idaho at 472, 65 P.3d at 213 ("It is wellestablished that blood draws to test for alcohol concentration fall within th[e]
exigency exception because blood alcohol content diminishes over time, and
valuable evidence would be lost in the time required to obtain a warrant."
(Citations omitted.)).
While Briggs asserts that "the state of technology,
advancements in medical and scientific technology over the past 40 years vitiate
the propriety of such a strenuous reliance" on the dissipation of alcohol
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8. n. 5), the state fails to see how advancements in
medicine, science or technology impact a body's metabolism. To the extent the
advancement upon which Briggs relies is the ability to conduct "retrograde
extrapolation" and the "conservative estimate[ ]" that "there exists at least a 3.6
hour window of opportunity during which a search warrant can be obtained to
14

D.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding
The Blood Draw In This Case Was Not Unreasonable
Briggs argues that, even assuming a blood draw could have been

performed in this case, the manner in which it was performed was constitutionally
unreasonable. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 28-29.) The record reveals otherwise.
"Fourth Amendment reasonableness standards are assessed objectively
by examining the totality of circumstances." Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at
742 (citations omitted). With respect to blood draws, "the procedure must be
done in a medically acceptable manner and without unreasonable force."
(emphasis added).

1st

The blood draw performed on Briggs complied with these

requirements.
After refusing the "somewhat less intrusive alternative" of submitting to a
breath test, Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742, law enforcement
transported Briggs to the hospital and requested the assistance of Lisa Branson,
a hospital phlebotomist.

(Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1-18.)

Although no testimony was

presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the stipulated facts as
presented included the failure of Briggs to cooperate at all throughout the
process. (Tr., p. 6, L. 21 - p 7; L 3.) Brigg$ indicated early on that he "was not
going to cooperate with any further testing."

(Tr., p. 6. Ls. 7-10.)

Briggs'

obtain a blood sample for forensic testing" (Appellant's Brief, p. 20. n. 7), the
state notes three things: (1) these arguments are not based upon any actual
evidence in the record, (2) it seems the "3.6 hour window of opportunity" would
require specific actual knowledge of the precise time of consumption relative to
the blood draw, which places an impossible burden on law enforcement to
ascertain whether an ex'rgency exists in any given case, and (3) if the SAC
testing conducted by the state shows a BAC of less than .08, the state may not
use "retrograde extrapolation" to prevent the bar on filing the case under I.C. §
18-8004(2). State v. Daniel, 132 Idaho 701, 979 P.2d 103 (1999).
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uncooperative conduct in "both word and deed" included him "yelling and cussing
as loud as he could, and making sexual comments about the officers and
hospital staffs' mothers and sisters." (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 4-12.) This conduct led to a
situation where "Captain Cook, Lieutenant Stacy, Officers Miller - Jay Miller, B.
Miller, P. Murray and himself, it appears, held Mr. Briggs down" while the
phlebotomist drew his blood.

(Tr., p. 6, Ls. 11-18.) This course of events, as

presented to the trial court on Briggs' motion to suppress, cannot be termed
constitutionally unreasonable under the circumstances. The trial court, in ruling
on the motion to suppress, found the amount of force used to obtain Briggs'
blood was similar in circumstance to situations upheld as constitutional in
previously decided Idaho cases, including Worthington. (Tr., p. 26, L. 9 - p. 27,
L. 8.)
In Worthington, witnesses testified that the defendant was "'fighting hard' kicking, cursing and flailing about." 138 Idaho at 473, 65 P.3d at 214. "Because
the lab technician feared that someone could be accidentally stuck by the needle,
she asked police to have enough people hold Worthington still so that she could
safely draw his blood."

kl

"In response to her request, three officers and two

nurses held Worthington while the lab technician extracted the blood."

kl

On

appeal, the Court concluded the amount of force used to restrain Worthington
"did not violate constitutional standards."

kl

Specifically, the Court stated: "All

of the evidence showed that the force used was reasonably necessary to restrain
him so that a blood sample could be taken. The police did not strike Worthington
or otherwise engage in violence or physical abuse. Worthington refused any less
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intrusive testing method, such as a breath test."

kl at 473-474,

65 P.3d at 214-

215.
Like Worthington, Briggs refused "any less intrusive testing method," and
was also uncooperative throughout the process.

The stipulated facts 4 at the

motion to suppress hearing were that several officers "held Mr. Briggs down"
while his blood was drawn. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 11-18.)
In light of the totality of the circumstances, Briggs has failed to establish
the manner in which his blood was drawn was constitutionally unreasonable. 5
Briggs has, therefore, failed to establish the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress.

4

Although Briggs cites to the preliminary hearing transcript for more specific
examples of Briggs' level of resistance and the actions taken by the officers in
response to transport him to the hospital for the blood draw (Appellant's Brief, p.
29), there is no indication that the parties requested the trial court consider such
evidence in ruling on the motion to suppress nor is there any indication that the
court did in fact have such evidence before it.
5
Recently, in State v. Martinez, the Court of Appeals was presented with similar
claims and held that a forcible blood draw did not violate Martinez's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from search and seizure nor was his actual blood
State v. Martinez, 2010
draw performed in an unreasonable manner.
Unpublished Opinion No. 471, Docket No. 35438 (May 18, 2010).
17

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of
conviction entered upon Briggs' conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the
influence.
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